(2 Parts—complete.)

Part 1

Lt. Col. SCHOLZ of the German OKW ABWEHR previously received the Order of the Rising Sun 4th Class because of his meritorious services in the case of the Axis. As you know, SCHOLZ has been in charge of communications of this attache office with the ABWEHR ever since OSHIMA was attache. He has taken the initiative whenever problems have arisen and has proved thoroughly helpful. Furthermore, in the matter of German-Japanese joint cryptanalytic work, he has been sparing no efforts in acting as intermediary between the two men in charge.

Part 2

SCHOLZ's record is not inferior to that of KEMP, who is in charge of codes, and therefore we would like to have SCHOLZ awarded the Order of the Sacred Treasure 3rd Class at the same time as KEMP is given his commendation.

[A-430]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

According to what a certain ABWEHR Major told one of our advisers in confidence, Lt. Col. SCHOLZ has served Japanese relations meritoriously with the ABWEHR and moreover, his German decorations —4G— foreign decorations.

The awarding by Japan of only the 4th Class is thought to have had a somewhat adverse effect.

Trans. 3-7-45

If you were planning air operations in British Malaya, I think the following preparatory steps would be necessary:

1. The thorough—going re-enforcement of the (?air?) units in Saigon, especially the dispatching of the best Imperial technicians to Saigon.

The accurate utilization of the detailed intelligence already collected and the establishment and utilization of new (?and efficient?) spy networks.

2. The execution of wind-speed observation with balloons having radio-sounding equipment, twice daily, in at least five places—Saigon, Hanoi, SHINNAN[b], Pin-Tung (Heito), and —IU[b]—. The systematization (of these stations) by means of specially established wireless network.

Please communicate the above to the Air Headquarters.

[a] SHINNANGUNTO-The New Southern Islands.
[b] Far Eastern Place Name A.

Trans. 2-12-45

As a result of the difficulty of maintaining communications between Japan and the various stations in Europe and in view of the increase in importance of the general reports intended as foreign propaganda together with estimations on conditions within the country, I am reporting in detail the following points that have been called to my attention regarding the editing of the above, and the changes in the office, and I request your consideration. http://louis1j1sheehan1.blogspot.com

1. In view of the increase of the news and its quick distribution one broadcast would be too long and too fatiguing on the announcer, hence we are dividing and increasing the time to two periods around 6 and 11 p.m. (Tokyo time) with broadcasts from 40 minutes to an hour each.

2. In harmony with the above object we will increase the content of the broadcast but at the same time we will be careful in selection and endeavor to avoid repetition.

3. (a) We will give explanations of new place names and personal names (particularly those relating to China) and idioms so that there will be no mistake in reading them. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

[A-431]

(b) Arrange for an immediate change in wave length.

(c) Distribution of reference material.

Re your #943[a] and #1012[a].

Concerning the agreement:

(a) It is the opinion of the authorities that it would be a good plan, because of various circumstances involved, to have the technical arrangements made by the officials of the Broadcasting Companies of both countries. Therefore, I want to support our original plan as much as possible.

(b) Paragraph 5.

The high officers of the Broadcasting Company liaison staff, are making it easy to conclude the agreement from the technical point of view. With regard to the participation of the Embassy, in case the German authorities request it, we have no objections to entering the statement that the liaison officers will attend to the business of contacting the Broadcasting Company according to instructions from the Ambassador. After bearing in mind the fact that I want to avoid the personal meddling of foreign officials in such private organizations as broadcasting companies, and since at my request it has already been proposed in the contents of the original plan for the agreement, please wire me the results of your investigations.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 8-27-41

Re your #758[a].

I took the matter up with the Germans and they said that in view of the remarkable advancements made in radio broadcasting of late, it had become an important function of a nation. Already, they said, the Germans have established a post of Radio Attache in Tokyo and in other of the more important capitals throughout the world, as diplomatic representatives. (FIKKARUTO has been appointed for the post in Tokyo.) The Germans are still desirous of making this an issue of inter-governmental agreement. They insist that the basic principles should be agreed upon between governments and that it is essential that the functions (of radio) be given recognition as being an integral part in the functions of a state.

They have no objections to leaving the details of the programs, etc., up to direct negotiations between the respective broadcasting companies. Furthermore, they have no objections to the exchanging of representatives of the respective broadcasting associations to maintain liaison. However, they wish to have the government retain the right to have the final say in all matters having political implications, such as, for example, the selection of speakers, etc.

Trans. 9-11-41

[A-432]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Germany has no intention of interfering with the organizations in foreign countries which have been specifically established to conduct this work.

I am, therefore, of the opinion that the matter at hand will have to be arranged and settled in its entirety through governmental negotiations or have the governments enter into agreements covering the general points and leaving the details up to negotiations between the broadcasting associations.

Please give this matter your immediate study, and advise us your decisions.

[a] See III, 863.

Trans. 9-13-41

Re your #1095[a].

In consideration of the operating conditions of the previously established exchange radio agreement between Japan and Italy being based on a sincere understanding between the radio bureaus of both countries, it is important to effect these exchange broadcasts at as early a date as possible. It is considered, from the political point of view, that such things as the broadcasting of the actual completion of agreements gives expression to matters of national importance, but if the German authorities, as a matter of Government policy, press for an understanding re this agreement beforehand, it is our opinion that we would like to have it confirmed by an exchange of notes. Bearing this in mind, and after negotiating once more, please wire me the results.

[a] See III, 864.

Trans. 9-18-41

Re your #814[a].

I had the matter taken up again with the German Government and they agreed that this agreement should be concluded between the two broadcasting associations and that the governments of the countries concerned should give recognition to it by exchanging memorandums. In such a case in reference to clause #5 they propose that: (a) It is necessary that those engaged in the work of broadcasting should reserve to the Government the ultimate right of censorship in matters of political importance; and (b) a clause should be included, as the Japanese Government proposed, to the effect that officials engaged in exchanging broadcasts should follow instructions given by the Ambassador. However, they insist upon deleting these conditions, giving as their reason the fact that since the agreement is one existing between the two broadcasting associations, these conditions have no binding power and

[A-433]

are inconsistent as a matter of form. I understand also that they insist, even in case the 5th clause is to be made effective, that the agreement should be one concluded between the two governments. Since a great deal of time has already been spent in discussing this matter, it would be well to put the plan into practice at once by compromising on this point. Please discuss the matter with them and wire me your reply.

[a] See III, 865.

Trans. 9-24-41

Re your #1163[a].

I have taken this matter up with the authorities concerned as a result of which it has been decided to (1) conclude the agreement between the broadcasting associations of the two countries based on our proposals regarding the exchange of broadcasts between Japan and Germany, and (2) to exchange a memorandum between the governments of the two countries in order to validify the above, also to eliminate Clause No. 5 of the proposals. However, the broadcasting association here desires, if there are no objections, to have the signing of the agreement take place in Tokyo. If this meets the mind of the Germans we plan to appoint Komori the head of the broadcasting association here as the representative of this broadcasting association and we would like to have the Germans select their representative and notify us. Further if Tokyo is to be the place of signing then the memorandum will be exchanged between myself and Ambassador Ott. Please ascertain Germany's desires regarding this and wire. Please be informed that the above memorandum will be patterned after the official document exchanged between Minister Arita and the German Ambassador resident in Tokyo on June -th 1939 in connection with the Japanese-German medical science agreement.

[a] See III, 866.

Trans. 9-30-41

Part 1 of 2[a].

Report on the situation.

1. The salient points in the Rumanian official announcement of the 5th are as follows: Rumanian Alpine and Cavalry forces are fighting with the Germans between the Dnieper and the Sea of Azov[b].  Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

The enemy in the region of Odessa bringing tanks, etc., from Crimea and the Caucasus, counterattacked but were routed.

[A-434]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Since the beginning of hostilities, Rumanian forces have captured 60,000, killed 70,000 and wounded 100,000, as well as repulsed 502 airplanes and captured a large amount of arms and material. The Rumanian losses were: 20,000 dead, 15,000 missing (half of which are thought to be prisoners and half slain), and 76,000 wounded, 80% of which recovering. Airplane losses—120. Some of the enemy tried to land in parachutes and others tried to flee, but more than 90% of them were captured without any losses on our part. There was not a single troop train, warehouse, bridge or factory that was not destroyed by aerial bombing. The fire at the Ploesti Petroleum works did not amount to any more than 300,000,000 lei. http://louis1j1sheehan1.blogspot.com

[a] Part 2 of 2 is not available.
[b] Part of the Black Sea, northeast of Crimea.

Trans. 10-13-41

Message from Berlin #1206.

Re your #856[a].

That this intelligence is the most ridiculous fabrication, I believe will be made clear should you compare this with my successive wires prior to and since the beginning of the German-Soviet conflict, but if I were to expound briefly proving this to be the case, it would be as follows:

1. Germany, prior to the beginning of military operations, filed absolutely no demands with the Soviet, nor were negotiations attempted at any time. Germany's motives in the war against the Soviet were for the purpose of consolidating her eastern front for the war against England. In order to do that, it was necessary to annihilate the Soviet field troops and to overthrow the Communist regime. It is clear that such objectives could not have been discussed over a conference table. Therefore, Germany, giving up fresh gestures of compromise, fell upon the Soviet with dispatch and decision. These circumstances outlined above have oft been reiterated by Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP to me.

2. The war against the Soviet is exactly as I have outlined above. It isn't as though Chancellor HITLER had been persuaded to take this course at the insistence of Foreign Minister VON RIBBENTROP, for it all emanates from the deep-rooted convictions within Chancellor HITLER himself. With regard to the future of the STALIN regime, VON RIBBENTROP from the beginning has been saying that it would be absolutely impossible to predict its future course. Therefore, it isn't as though they were overly optimistic. It is an utter fabrication to say that Germany is now reaping the mistake of last June in turning against Russia, even though it is true that the Soviet is putting up a fight far more obstinate than Germany imagined possible. VON RIBBENTROP, as ever, is in the closest confidence of Chancellor HITLER, helping and advising daily at the Supreme Headquarters. Therefore, there is no truth in the statement that he is operating his own spy agency or anything else like that. Such things as these which are being circulated in the United States are pure nonsense and only for the purpose of driving a wedge between Japan and Germany. (This should clarify such a question as c under 1 in your message.) In the handling of intelligences such as these, I would like to have the home office be very careful as to the credence placed in them.

[A-435]

Furthermore, the need for maintaining the secrecy of my wires written around the time covering the opening of German-Soviet warfare is becoming less important. Therefore, I believe that it would be a good thing for competent authorities to peruse those wires as one bit of evidence.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-7-41

According to reports received from the German High Command through their Foreign Office, the following are the division designations of the Russian Far Eastern forces which have made their appearance in the German-Russian hostilities since the middle of September. These had already ceased to exist as organized divisions since the middle of August, and in addition to those listed, two other infantry divisions have since arrived.

Furthermore, according to the Germans, it has been observed that recently the Russian forces have been successively transferred westward.

This information is being sent you in view of the intense propaganda which is being sent out by the British and Americans regarding the strength of the Soviet forces in the Far East:

#40 (3rd, 108th, 63rd, 99th Inf., 60th Art.)
#32, 39 (50th, 65th, 199th, 254th, Inf., 22nd, 205th Art.)
#104 (124th, 217th, 273rd Inf., 290th, 502nd Art., 163rd Recn. Btn.)
#92 (88th, 753rd Art.)
#22 (2nd, 872nd Inf., 75th Art.)
#26 (28th, 30th Inf., 26th Art.)
#105 (Belonging to the First Special Army)
#54 (82nd, 118th, 244th, Inf., 41st Art., 58th, 86th Independent Art.)
#34 (4th Inf., 256th Art., belonging to 2nd Special Army)
#57 (13th, 74th Inf., belonging to the Baikal District Army).

Trans. 10-8-41

(To be handled in Government Code.)

In connection with my wire #1224[a], having to do with the German-Soviet military situation, I met with army and naval attaches today in joint conference to collate impressions received by them at the time of their recent tour of observation on the eastern front as well as to discuss various intelligences. We gave considerable thought and made numerous critical observations on all phases.

The campaign against Moscow has opened with dispatch and success. If they are able to keep up at this rate and can dispose of the Russian troops in Moscow and in the neighborhood of that city, it is thought that the eastern front can be consolidated before long.

[A-436]

THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Though it would seem that in England and the United States they are publicizing propaganda to the effect that Germany, immediately after the fall of Moscow, will offer peace to the Soviet, just as 1 reported Chancellor HITLER to have told me in my #924[a], such a thing as that could never come about. As far as Germany is concerned, her principal strength in the future will be directed toward the war against England. But, on the other hand, she will not weaken her aggressive attack on the Soviet until the Communist regime has been overthrown; that much is clear. The situation outlined above puts the lie to British and American propaganda that the war between Germany and the Soviet has been stalemated, and Germany's military strength exhausted. As far as the Imperial Government is concerned, utmost caution should be taken not to believe such statements as those. It is self-evident that the fall of Moscow would be a tremendous blow to the STALIN regime. The fall of Moscow, too, will have an enormous effect insofar as the Far East is concerned. In my opinion, I believe that it is absolutely imperative that the Imperial Government should give due consideration to the various phases of the situation as I have outlined above, and without the slightest hesitation decide upon its counter-policies. I have incorporated my humble opinions in this dispatch.

Please transmit this message to army and naval officials.

[a] Not available.

Trans. 10-10-41

Part 1 of 5.

I have already in successive messages, expressed myself in regard to developments in the European war situation and in regard to the measures we should take to meet them. But after having conferred with Vice Admiral Nomura and the military and naval attaches, in view of recent developments, I would submit my further opinions as follows:

1. In the German-Soviet war, the Soviet army having been found to possess far greater weapons than was imagined, and the entire nation having been aroused to stubborn resistance, the German army has not attempted the impossible in attacking them, but has been planning their annihilation by more deliberately considered methods of warfare. Therefore, it cannot be denied that in point of time it has taken longer than the German army planned. However, on the other hand, the resulting losses, not only to the Soviet army, but to the entire Soviet Union, have been much greater. Up until the beginning of the recent large operations, with but very small losses to themselves, the Germans had already wiped out 5,000,000 Soviet troops (of which 2,500,000 were prisoners). Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Now they are beginning the large scale siege of Moscow which I mentioned in my #1224[a]. Timoshenko's troops, of which but few remained after the siege of Vyazma and Bryansk, will again be given a terrific beating, and the fate of Moscow can be said to be settled already.

Thus the Germans have dealt a devastating blow to the Soviet forces before the real winter sets in, as per plan. They have seized the larger part of the Soviet's raw materials, and will soon reduce Russia to a condition from which they will be unable to rise again. While it cannot be said that this brought the war with the Soviet to a conclusion, there is no doubt that the success of the operations in these parts can be considered one stage in the developments, http://louis1j1sheehan1.blogspot.com

[A-437]

preparing the way for the removal of the main strength to the northwest (i.e. of Europe) and the beginning of the next operations.

[a] Not translated.

Trans. 10-15-41