(In 3 parts—complete)

The details of the Wakasugi-Welles conversations will be reported in a subsequent cable[a], but in the meantime, I shall submit this which concerns the two points on which you requested information in your message #658°. In view of the fact that the talks lasted for over two hours, will you please await the subsequent message for the details of the tone, etc. of the talks.

In general, the tone of the talks was friendly and frank. Welles said that there is no change in the President's expressed desire of meeting with the Premier if the three points can be agreed upon. He added that Secretary Hull is in full agreement on this point, too. Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

(1) As far as he knew, Welles said, there were no obstacles to the materialization of the leaders' conference, other than the three points. Wakasugi said that he got the impression that Secretary Hull was of the opinion that there would be one or two more points which would have to be cleared up when the preliminary arrangements were brought up to date, and asked Welles about that. Welles replied that he had not been advised by Hull of those points but that he would ascertain them and then advise us.  http://142267louis0j0sheehan0esquire.wordpress.com

(Part 2)

With regard to the matter of withdrawing or stationing troops in China, Wakasugi said that the U.S. attitude had been made clear in her proposal of 21 June and again in her oral state-

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ment of 2 October. We have no intention of arguing about that point any further, Wakasugi continued, but that he would like to ask one question about it. This question was his own personal one as an individual and was not instigated by or put with the knowledge of either the Government or the Ambassador.  http://142267louis0j0sheehan0esquire.wordpress.com

So saying, Wakasugi said that when a nation had been sending fighting forces to another over a long period of years, it was exceedingly difficult, from a practical standpoint, to suddenly evacuate them. Even if such a program were to be carried out, years and months would be required before its completion, Wakasugi said, adding that Welles, who has had long years of experience as a diplomat should well understand that.

Moreover, Wakasugi continued, the matter of whether troops were to be removed or not was a matter involving Japan and China. Should, therefore, the United States be assured the withdrawal of troops by Japan, would the United States be willing to leave the details up to Japan and China to decide?

(Part 3)

Welles replied that that would depend entirely upon Japan's sincerity. If Japan is truly sincere in her assurance of troop evacuation there no doubt would be ways of coming to a successful agreement as to ways and means of carrying it out.

1. The United States has no intention of making any counter proposals other than those she has already submitted to Japan on 21 June and the Oral Statement of 2 October. The above two proposals were the result of careful and thorough consideration. However, it is in the realm of possibility that if the objectives contained in those proposals are kept intact the wording may, under certain circumstances, be altered. The United States objections to the Japanese proposals of 6 September and 25 September are based on the fact that they considerably restrict the terms contained in the two U.S. proposals—which incidentally, contained the terms of the earlier Japanese proposals—referred to above.

[a] Available, See III, 269. (A 6 part message, only Part 4 available at present.)
[b] See III, 265—Since the situation at home is fast approaching a crisis, in your talks with Welles cover the entire subject of the U.S.-Japanese negotiations, and in particular, just what the U.S. wants reevacuation or garrisoning of troops in China.

Trans. 10-20-41

Re my #939[a].

The telegram regarding the Wakasugi-Welles conference should be sent as separate telegram #941[b], however, in view of the urgency of the situation, it will not be set up as a Chief of Office Routing telegram, but please handle it as such.

[a] See III, 267.
[b] A 6-part message, only Part 4 available at present, see III, 269.

Trans. 10-20-41

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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

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(In 6 parts—Part 4 only available)

5. Of the three points, please be advised of the matter pertaining to withdrawing or stationing of our troops in China, by my previous report.

6. Wakasugi, therefore, said that in the final analysis, the stumbling block lies in the fact that whereas the United States is interested in agreeing upon basic principles first, Japan is insisting that the matter of primary importance is the clearing up of the outstanding differences first and then to discuss the generalities such as basic principles, etc. The truth of the matter is, Wakasugi continued, it is indeed rarely that a basic principle can be carried as such to any satisfactory degree. Moreover, he pointed out, without agreements or concrete factors, an agreement on principle is without meaning.

To this, the Undersecretary said that the basic principle should first be agreed upon, after which the actual problems can be fitted to it for individual agreements-----(2 lines missed)—(Waskasugi pointed out that) our proposal of 6 September expressed a willingness to sacrifice a practically unanimous desire of the people of Japan for a northward and
or southward military move, for the sake of an adjusted relationship with the United States. This was indeed a bold stroke and probably one which a subsequent cabinet, regardless of its nature, would not dare to duplicate.

In view of this daring step, wouldn't the United States be willing to display some boldness in behalf of great statesmanship, Waskasugi asked.

The Undersecretary said that he fully appreciated our moves and that the United States felt considerable encouragement therefrom. However, the United States has experienced disappointing reverses he said, pointing to the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China, even after matters had progressed to the point of the United States submitting the 21 June proposal.

Wakasugi, therefore, pointed out that the occupation of French Indo-China had a direct bearing on the China incident. He explained that, with a view to our security, we took this step with the agreement of the Government of France.

Trans. 10-21-41

We have made the necessary arrangements for a telephone connection between Chief of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, Terasaki, and Minister Wakasugi, for noon (Japan time) on the 14th. On this occasion, the following passwords and codes will be used.

Trans. 10-14-41

(Part 1 of 2.)[a] (To be handled in Government Code.)

I had an interview with Rear Admiral TURNER. If I sum up what he told me, it is this: "What the United States wants is not just a pretense but a definite promise. Should a conference of the leaders of the two governments be held without a definite preliminary agreement, and should, in the meantime, an advance be made into Siberia, the President would be placed in a terrible predicament. Japan speaks of peace in the Pacific and talks as if she can decide matters independently, and so it would seem to me that Japan could set aside most of her obligations toward the Three-Power Alliance. As to the question of withdrawing or stationing troops, since it is impossible to withdraw troops all at once, it would seem that a detailed agreement could be arranged between Japan and China for a gradual withdrawal."

He speculated on the various difficulties which Japan had to face internally. It seems that this opinion of his has also been given to the Secretary of State.

[a] See III, 272.

Trans. 10-16-41

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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

(Part 2 of 2)

He said that should the Russo-German war suddenly end and should Germany offer Great Britain peace, it would be after all a German peace and England would not now accept it. Now, this man is a responsible fellow in an important position and I take it that this is the view of the Navy. On the other hand, HOOVER and his following consider that should Moscow make a separate peace with Berlin and should Berlin then turn to London with generous peace terms, this whole fray would end with unimaginable quickness. This, however, I take to be a minority view entertained by the Isolationists.

Trans. 10-15-41

(Part 1 of 2)

On the evening of the 15th TERASAKI was invited to the home of Admiral TURNER, who, as you know, is a most trusted friend of Admiral STARK. In the course of their conversation TURNER said:

(a) "If HITLER gains control over Europe, it will constitute a direct threat to Central and South America, and America must certainly fight this. Therefore, it is the present policy of the United States to prevent the enfeeblement of Great Britain's national resources (including the Far East) by assisting her in stopping Germany."

(b) "It is said that the present Japanese cabinet is a strong one; however, it is doubtful whether it has the support of the Army, and if the Military finds itself at variance with the opinion of the cabinet, the cabinet might be overthrown at any time. Therefore, the United States cannot help feeling a little trepidation in broaching any negotiations with the Japanese Government under these circumstances."

(c) "It is urgent that a formula be drawn up on the basis of a fifty-fifty compromise between Tokyo and Washington." (TURNER does not think that we are compromising.)   Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

Trans. 10-20-41

(Part 2 of 2)

TERASAKI explained that some Americans had already questioned him about the permanence of the present cabinet but that this was beside the point because to broach the Japanese-American negotiations while doubting the permanence of the cabinet was putting the cart before the horse. He said that at present when mutual doubts were rife, particularly in the United States, the United States ought certainly to exercise statesmanship, and continued, "The United States is exceedingly idealistic concerning the Far East. Aiding China might be

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called a question of principle, but if I may say so, this talk of principles is a sort of hobby among the rich. If it's not a question of principle, all I can conclude is that you all are determined to make us fight with China until we are exhausted. On the other hand, you have followed a very, very realistic policy in Central America. Forgetting the history of Panama for a moment, we can find plenty of present examples proving what I say. Well, China is not an over-simplified question of principle with us Japanese. It is a question of our life. We have already fought there for four years. You went to Japan on the Astoria. I am sure you know something of the temperament of the Japanese. Once a Japanese is in a corner, he will forget all interest in life and death and fight back with fury. I know that we are much poorer than you Americans in material things. I don't know what the result of Japanese-American war might be, but even though we lost, I can tell you we would put up an awful fight. If we do not achieve what we are trying to do, it may come to that. Now if you Americans would only extend your hand in friendship to us a little, you could have our lasting amity; otherwise, we may turn out to be permanent enemies.http://142267louis0j0sheehan0esquire.wordpress.com

Trans. 10-22-41

Regarding your #939[a] and #941[b].

Your message has clarified many points regarding the situation and the matter can be charged up to Welles' state of agitation. However, as I feel that further conversations with Wakasugi might be continued, please maintain contact and also bear the following points in mind:

(1) If we quibble over the argument set forth in paragraph 6 of your message #94l[b] it may give them an opening to insist on having the Four Principles included in the text proper of the agreement.

However, since not only have the so-called basic American stipulations been omitted from the preamble of the American proposal of June 21st, but the reference is made in the final clause to the effect that the principles (stipulations) contained in the proposal of June 21st are also included in the document of October 2nd. We wish to hold to this and should take advantage of the American desire to use the proposal of June 21st as the basis of negotiations and continue our conversations on the basis of the same proposal, without taking up the Four Principles independently.

(2) Our proposal is nothing more than our proposal of September 16th incorporated into the American proposal of June 21st. However, there is no need for us to make any further move until the other side decides that it is impossible to clarify the concrete proposal any further. Therefore please discuss the points of variance between our proposal and that of June 21st and ascertain the United States' intentions regarding the various points involved in the concrete proposal, and reply results.

(3) Due to the nature of this negotiation we wish to have it handled between Wakasugi and Welles, for the time being, and should progress warrant, to transfer the whole negotiation to be handled between you and the Secretary of State.

[a] See III, 267.
[b] See III, 269. A 6 part message, only part 4 available at present.

Trans. 10-20-41

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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

Chief of Office routing.
Regarding your #667[a].

Tomorrow afternoon (16th) Wakasugi is expected to confer with Welles. Yesterday (14th) "O" is said to have conferred with the President and also with the heads of the Far Eastern Affairs. (For your information.)

The Military Attache here has been instructed by the headquarters in Tokyo to advise us not to yield an inch in our stand regarding the question of the evacuation of troops. They are apprehensive that we have not emphasized enough our stand regarding it and urge us to lay special stress on this point.

It goes without saying that we fully understand our country's stand regarding this question and both Colonel Iwasa and I have repeatedly informed the other side of this.

However, when Wakasugi conferred with Welles on the 13th, he purposely did not go deeply into the subject of the evacuation of troops because it happens to be one of the three major questions which have been gone over many times before and the purpose of the above conference was to clarify certain points in the United States' proposal in order to ascertain their intentions. You may be assured that we do not intend to minimize the importance of this question nor to effect any compromise.

At tomorrow's conference we intend to bring up this question for discussion once again.

Should you have any inquiry from the Military regarding this matter please explain the above in order to avoid any misunderstanding. I have already explained the situation as stated above to our Military Attache.

[a] See III, 275.

Trans. 10-20-41

Although I have been requested by both the German and Italian Ambassadors in Tokyo to give them confidential information on the Japanese-American negotiations, I have, in consideration of the nature of the negotiations, been declining to do so. However, early this month, following the German attacks on American merchant ships and the consequent (revival?) of the movements for the revision of the Neutrality Act, the German authorities demanded that the Japanese Government submit to the American Government a message to the effect that the Japanese Government observes that if the ROOSEVELT administration continues to attack the Asia Powers increasingly, a belligerent situation would inevitably arise between Germany and Italy on the one hand and the United States on the other, and this would provide the reasons for the convocation of the duties envisioned in the Three Power agreement and might lead Japan to join immediately the war in opposition to the United States. We have not, as yet, submitted this message because, in view of the Japanese-American negotiations, we found it

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necessary to consider carefully the proper timing as well as wording of the message. The German authorities have been repeatedly making the same request and there are reasons which do not permit this matter to be postponed.

Trans. 10-17-41

The Imperial Japanese Government has repeatedly affirmed to the American Government that the aim of the Tripartite Pact is to contribute toward the prevention of a further extension of the European war. Should, however, the recent tension in the German-American relations suffer aggravation, there would arise a distinct danger of a war between the two powers, a state of affairs over which Japan, as a signatory to the Tripartite Pact, naturally cannot help entertain a deep concern. Accordingly, in its sincere desire that not only the German-American relations will cease further deterioration but the prevailing tension will also be alleviated as quickly as possible, the Japanese Government is now requesting the earnest consideration of the American Government.http://142267louis0j0sheehan0esquire.wordpress.com

Trans. 10-16-41

The Cabinet has reached a decision to resign as a body. At this time I wish to thank Your Excellency and your entire staff for all the efforts you have made.

The resignation was brought about by a split within the Cabinet. It is true that one of the main items on which opinion differed was on the matter of stationing troops or evacuating them from China. However, regardless of the makeup of the new Cabinet, negotiations with the United States shall be continued along the lines already formulated. http://142267louis0j0sheehan0esquire.wordpress.com There shall be no changes in this respect.

Please, therefore, will you and your staff work in unison and a single purpose, with even more effort, if possible, than before.

Trans. 10-18-41

(Part 1 of 5) (Extremely Urgent)

By previous arrangement WAKASUGI, HULL and WELLES had a conference lasting two hours beginning at 5:00 p.m., on the 16th. The substance of their talk was as follows: (Probably because he had received news of our Cabinet's general resignation, WELLES said that he would like to talk with WAKASUGI in the presence of Secretary HULL. He led WAKASUGI to HULL's room and they talked together.)   Louis J. Sheehan, Esquire

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THE "MAGIC" BACKGROUND OF PEARL HARBOR

1. HULL asked the circumstances of the Cabinet's general resignation and wished to know what the outlook for the new Cabinet was. WAKASUGI said that all we had received was a public announcement of the general resignation and as yet no detailed news had reached us. WAKASUGI continued, "No matter what sort of Cabinet it is, however, it is impossible to leave Japanese-American relations in their present state. The world being in its present condition, particularly faced by the China problem, our people cannot continue undecided as they now are in the face of American opposition. They demanded a Government that would take a definite stand either to the right or to the left. There is no mistake about that. If no unanimity can be discovered between our two nations, it would be hard to say in which direction the wind will blow. I wanted to talk with the Under Secretary today and see if we could not find some points of agreement between your proposal of June 21st and our proposal of September 25th. That is why I came."

Trans. 10-20-41